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European integration exerts a vast influence on national policy making. In response, national 
parliaments have strengthened their position in the European policy making process. The 
Treaty of Lisbon has added more direct instruments to this toolkit: through the so-called Early 
Warning System (EWS) it has provided national parliaments with a direct role in EU policy 
making. Commonly known as the “yellow card procedure”, the EWS provides national 
parliaments with an independent power to assess whether Commission proposals are in line 
with the subsidiarity principle. To this end, parliaments may send a reasoned opinion (RO) to 
the Commission within eight weeks after the publication of a legislative proposal. If more than 
one third of the national parliaments pass a negative opinion, this results in a “yellow card”, 
which necessitates reconsideration of the proposal by the Commission. Additionally, in 2006, 
Commission President Barroso initiated the non-binding instrument of the political dialogue. 
This provides national parliaments with the opportunity to react to Commission legislative 
proposals beyond scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle. 
This study, commissioned by the Tweede Kamer, focuses on the functioning and 
effects of the instruments and procedures implemented by national parliaments in response to 
the Lisbon Treaty in order to increase their control over EU policy making. In doing so, it aims 
to draw lessons for the Tweede Kamer, with an eye on improving the functioning and effects of 
the new instruments. In order to do so, the following elements of national parliamentary 
control over EU affairs are analysed in the Tweede Kamer and nine other parliaments. 
 
EU scrutiny in the Tweede Kamer 
The Tweede Kamer has gradually strengthened its position in EU affairs, to the extent that it 
wants to be ‘on top of Europe’. To this end, EU scrutiny in the Tweede Kamer has been 
mainstreamed, by largely making the sectoral committees responsible for EU control. The 
starting point of scrutiny is the systematic prioritisation of Commission proposals on the basis 
of the Commission’s annual Work Programme. Upon publication of a Commission proposal, EU 
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staff members write a memo for treatment, comprising suggestions for scrutiny and control 
instruments that could be deployed. MPs may use regular parliamentary instruments, such as 
motions, questions, and general consultations with the minister, or specific EU-related 
instruments, notably the scrutiny reserve and the subsidiarity check. The scrutiny reserve is an 
instrument aimed at structuring the information provision by the Cabinet surrounding Council 
meetings. The subsidiarity check, secondly, implements the EWS for the Netherlands.  
The Tweede Kamer uses the EWS rather actively, producing a steady output of ROs and 
scrutiny reserves.  It also is quite ambitious, wanting to be a pioneer in the issuance of a yellow 
card. To this end, it recently proposed several improvements to the EWS procedure, such as 
more substantive Commission answers, increase of the eight-week deadline for yellow cards, 
the lowering of the threshold, and broadening of the EWS towards proportionality and legal 
base. 
Concerning effects, there is a shared sense of dissatisfaction about the effects of the 
yellow cards produced so far. Yet, the fact that it has proved possible to draw two yellow cards 
is seen as positive. Turning to the conditions, capacity at the administrative level was not 
flagged as a main problem, although the work load is perceived to be rather high, especially by 
sectoral committee staff. The Tweede Kamer has committed to playing a key role between the 
European Union and Dutch citizens, even though activity between party groups is claimed to 
vary. According to several respondents, the use of the EWS instrument in the end is a cost-
benefit calculation made by MPs, a crucial condition being an MP taking the initiative. 
 
Thematic analysis 
Our study provided evidence of the relative importance of indirect instruments, related to the 
control of national government in EU matters, in the great majority of parliaments. Our 
analysis of the nine parliaments identified indirect instruments that are stronger than those of 
the Tweede Kamer. Regarding voting rights, some parliaments can oblige the government to 
provide extensive information about Council negotiations. Several parliaments we studied 
have stronger voting instruments, in the form of legally or politically binding mandates. Finland 
and Sweden have strong instrument for follow-up after Council meetings. Some parliaments 
have fixed rapporteurs in sectoral committees, as is the case in Belgium.  
Concerning procedures for the subsidiarity check, the main differences are between 
decentralized and EAC-dominated systems, and the role of the plenary. Three parliaments 
deliberately developed highly complicated procedures, so as to make use of the EWS 
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impossible. The role of the administration typically is to aid selection and prioritization of 
Commission proposals. Parliaments seem united in their understanding of the subsidiarity 
principle as a legal concept; concerns about breaches of the principle however, are activated 
on the basis of political reasons  
Actual use of the EWS and Political Dialogue is highly divergent between parliaments. 
Concerning effects, broadly described, there is low faith in legislative effectiveness, as is 
confirmed by interviews with the European institutions. Individual ROs were said to have 
limited influence. Also, a boomerang effect of being too active with ROs may occur: they are 
alleged to weaken a parliament’s credibility with the Commission and parliaments in less active 
member states. Personal contacts with the Commission at an early stage are seen as more 
effective than formal contacts through the EWS. Also, ROs receive little attention by MEPs. At 
the same time, the feeling is that, if national parliaments really want to have their voice heard 
in Brussels, they have to persist. Arguably, also, the EWS has increased the urgency to take 
subsidiarity seriously. In addition, several side effects came to the fore, ranging from an 
increase in EU awareness to better substantive scrutiny of Commission proposals. 
The analysis did not produce an equivocal explanation for the use of the EWS and 
political dialogue. Awareness and capacity seem to matter in some parliaments, whereas 
complicated procedures preclude active use of the instrument elsewhere. Institutionally strong 
parliaments tend to use the instruments more actively, even though the presence of strong 
mandating powers does not necessarily prevent use of the EWS. In addition, the interviews 
provided support for the importance of role conceptions. On the one hand, various rather pro-
European parliaments are hesitant to use the instruments. On the other hand, various 
parliaments do not see direct control over EU policy making as a responsibility of national 
parliaments.  
Finally, the interviews yielded positive views of the role of parliamentary 
representatives in Brussels. COSAC, according to a majority of respondents, could be improved 
by improving quality of debate, and making it more informal so as to counter the problem of 
absent national mandates. IPEX is not seen as a useful information system, because many 
parliaments cannot share information on it. Turning to the EU institutions, most respondents 
were highly critical about the European EWS procedure, complaints concerning the lack of 
influence, tight time frame and low quality and speed of Commission responses. In turn, 
respondents at the EU level suggest parliaments to improve their motivation in ROs, have a 
standard opening paragraph, and a uniform interpretation of subsidiarity. Also, they 
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recommend to actively follow-up on ROs, and to look for commonalities of interest rather than 
just differences. The main message concerning cooperation with the European institutions is 
that the EWS should be seen as one step in a longer process of influencing, starting with Green 




1. An integrated but selective approach. When adopting an RO, the Tweede Kamer is 
recommended to channel time and resources into an integrated approach, meaning that it 
should be seen as a complement to control over the government, and that it requires 
active follow-up, and scrutiny of Green and White Papers. An instrument that could be 
helpful to this end is the appointment of a rapporteur. The Tweede Kamer is explicitly 
advised to reserve this integrated approach for highly salient dossiers, based on broad and 
explicit political will to “go all the way”. This should be compensated by the critical 
reconsideration of activities in the field of EU control that are less effective or visible: 
passing high numbers of ROs should not become an end in itself; the scrutiny reserve and 
subsidiarity check procedures may be simplified and/or replaced by a generalized 
agreement on improved information provision, as exists in various other parliaments. 
2. Improving the EWS. Two amendments constitute a minimalist agenda shared by all EU-28: 
an extension of the eight-week deadline to twelve or even sixteen weeks, and enhanced 
responsiveness both in turn-over time and substance of the reactions by the Commission. 
The Tweede Kamer is advised to take the lead in reforms during the upcoming Dutch 
Presidency of the EU in 2016, and follow-up on its earlier proposal of developing a 
common opening paragraph.  
3. Inter-parliamentary cooperation. Several parliaments lack the willingness and/or capacity 
to play an active role under the EWS. Therefore, the Tweede Kamer is recommended to 
focus its attention on those parliaments willing and able to play an independent role at the 
European stage. The Tweede Kamer could stimulate the sharing of national priority lists 
and responses to Green Books and White Books in IPEX. The Tweede Kamer is advised to 
host COSAC meetings ‘new style’ during the Dutch presidency, along the following lines: 
more room for informal exchange, the possibility of side meetings on substantive dossiers 
instead of having long plenary sessions, less central a role for representatives of EU 
institutions, and more agenda influence by other parliaments. 
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1.1 Background  
European integration exerts a vast influence on national policy making, both through 
legislation and softer measures like recommendations and the Open Method of Coordination.3 
In response, national parliaments have strengthened their position in the European policy 
making process. Initially, they focused on instruments for controlling the position of national 
governments in EU negotiations. The Treaty of Lisbon has added more direct instruments to 
this toolkit: through the so-called Early Warning System (EWS) it has provided national 
parliaments with a direct role in EU policy making. 
Commonly known as the “yellow card procedure”, the EWS provides national 
parliaments with an independent power to assess whether Commission proposals are in line 
with the subsidiarity principle. To this end, parliaments may send a reasoned opinion (RO) to 
the Commission within eight weeks after the publication of a legislative proposal. If more than 
one third of the national parliaments pass a negative opinion (a quarter where the proposal 
pertains to the so-called ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’), this results in a “yellow 
card”, which necessitates reconsideration of the proposal by the Commission. Finally, if a 
majority of national parliaments contest a draft, the Commission is expected to come up with 
a reasoned opinion if it decides to maintain it nevertheless; Parliament or Council are 
supposed to review the proposal, and either may decide to reject it (the “orange card”). 
Additionally, in 2006, Commission President Barroso initiated the non-binding instrument of 
the political dialogue. This provides national parliaments with the opportunity to react to 
Commission legislative proposals beyond scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle.4 
After and even in the run-up to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, national 
parliaments have implemented new procedures to apply these instruments in practice.5 These 
procedures establish the steps necessary to pass a reasoned opinion, and to enable inter-
parliamentary cooperation. Finally, several parliaments used the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty to introduce additional instruments increase parliamentary influence over EU policy 




1.2 Framework of the study 
This study, which was commissioned by the Tweede Kamer6, focuses on the functioning and 
effects of the instruments and procedures implemented by national parliaments in response to 
the Lisbon Treaty in order to increase their control7 over EU policy making.8 In doing so, it aims 
to draw lessons for the Tweede Kamer, with an eye on improving the functioning and effects of 
the new instruments. In order to do so, the following elements of national parliamentary 
control over EU affairs are analyzed: 
 Parliamentary instruments adopted in response to the Lisbon Treaty. These may be 
indirect, targeted at the national government, or direct, focusing on EU decision 
makers; 
 Parliamentary procedures concerning the EWS. Attention will be paid to the role of 
sectoral committees, the plenary, and the government; 
 Perceived practical functioning of national procedures for the EWS, including the view 
of subsidiarity; 
 Actual use of the EWS and political dialogue in quantitative terms; 
 Desired and perceived effects of the EWS and political dialogue; 
 Conditions for adoption of ROs by national parliaments; 
 Inter-parliamentary cooperation, as a crucial condition for the adoption of yellow 
cards; 
 Cooperation with the EU institutions, as a key condition for legislative influence, i.e. 
modification or withdrawal of a Commission proposal in line with parliamentary 
preferences.  
Based on existing literature on the EWS and various exploratory interviews, we specified a 
number of dimensions and expectations with regards to the effects of the EWS and political 
dialogue, and the conditions under which these effects are realized. 
Expected effects 
Ian Cooper9 has listed three possible direct effects of the EWS, namely legislative influence, a 
more direct link between the EU and its citizens, and improved public debate on EU affairs. In 
addition, several side effects are expected: more awareness of MPs; tighter scrutiny of EU 
proposals beyond subsidiarity; and influence on other channels of national representation, 




Table 1 | Overview of expected effects of the EWS 
Direct effects Legislative function 
 Influence on legislative outcomes 
Representative function 
 “New link” between Europe and the citizen 
Deliberative function 
 More political debate on EU affairs 
Indirect effects  More awareness of EU issues at national level 
 Tighter scrutiny of EU proposals beyond subsidiarity 
 Affecting national position in Council negotiations 
 
Conditions  
There are three broad theoretical perspectives on parliamentary control that help us identify 
the conditions (or “incentives”) for national parliaments to issue a reasoned opinion. First, 
according to the constitutional or delegation perspective10, the conditions for exerting 
parliamentary control are rather a-political, and most importantly include the awareness, 
encompassing knowledge of existence and functioning of the instruments, and capacity of 
politicians and their staff.11 It has been shown that this is indeed also important for the use of 
the subsidiarity instrument and the adoption of an RO. In particular, knowledge about the EWS 
and the capacity to issue an RO within a limited time frame are important conditions.12 Then, 
the complexity of the procedure for the EWS seems to play a role: procedures involving more 
players are likely to be used less often. As such, systems in which ROs must be adopted by the 
plenary are likely to produce fewer ROs, because of the time pressure. Systems involving 
sectoral committees are likely to boost the use of the EWS, because the workload can be 
shared. Furthermore, strong parliamentary information rights are likely to increase the use of 
the EWS, because this provides better access to information about often highly complex 
proposals. Finally, Christiansen et al. point out that the presence of strong mandating powers 
can lead to less interest in the use of the EWS, because these are a strong alternative.13 
Second, according to the cultural perspective14 the conditions for the use of particular 
parliamentary instruments are mainly a matter of tradition. Parliamentary traditions are said 
to shape and be shaped by the role orientations of MPs, as well as by MPs’ beliefs about the 
functions a parliament should fulfil.15 Crucially, role orientations reflect the general 
understanding of the parliament’s function vis-à-vis the executive. In many political systems, 
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the main conflict lines are between coalition and opposition parties, rather than between 
parliament and government.16  With regard to EU affairs, Katrin Auel has for example used this 
perspective to explain why coalition parties in the German Bundestag are rather inactive when 
it comes to controlling the German government in EU affairs.17  Finally, role orientations may 
relate to a population’s general stance towards EU integration.18 
The previous conditions are rather structural qualities of parliaments or political 
parties in them. In contrast, the third perspective, the so-called negotiation perspective, takes 
a “micro” perspective, and argues that effective control depends on the substantive aspects or 
the political salience of a particular dossier.19 Both media attention and interest group support 
may influence the political cost-benefit analysis made by MPs to actually engage in scrutiny.20 
Although these conditions have so far not been extensively tested, a first empirical study has 
suggested that the salience of draft legislation is an important incentive for issuing an RO.21  
Evidently, the three broad theoretical perspectives on parliamentary control point at 
different conditions for the use of EU-related control instruments, and in particular for the 
adoption of an RO. As such, these perspectives may also further our understanding of 
conditions for the adoption of a yellow card, as a second step in the causal chain. That is, the 
threshold for the yellow card can only be reached when enough other parliaments (or a 
majority of parties in them) score “positively” on the conditions necessary for use of the EWS 
instrument. Particularly, previous research has shown that inter-parliamentary cooperation is 
key to reaching the threshold for a yellow card.22 In light of the three theoretical perspectives, 
we can thus expect that inter-parliamentary cooperation to reach the threshold for the yellow 
card is more likely to occur between parliaments with a role conception that is favourable to 
the use of the EWS, with the capacity to carry out a subsidiarity check, and with a majority of 
political groups in each of them making a cost-benefit analysis pursuant to adoption of an RO. 
Furthermore, to be effective, inter-parliamentary cooperation is dependent on some rather 
trivial preconditions, such as time and resources. Finally, it must be noted that intra-
parliamentary cooperation in bicameral systems is also important. Theoretically, procedures 
for joint submission of ROs could lead to more ROs. 
A third set of conditions relates to the influence on the outcome of the EU legislative 
process. Crucially, a yellow card is one of the many inputs in the complicated multi-level policy 
making process of the Union, in which many institutions play a role. If we view ROs and yellow 
cards as inputs into the full EU policy making process, it seems that cooperation with the 
European institutions playing a key role in this process is crucial. In addition, the European 
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procedures for dealing with contributions from national parliaments themselves will be 
evaluated, by looking at the perceptions of key stakeholders. We will identify conditions in this 
field inductively from the interviews. 
 
1.3 Approach 
The research consisted of five stages: 
1. An exploratory analysis of the situation in Dutch parliament, primarily the Tweede 
Kamer, consisting of interviews with thirteen key political and administrative players. 
2. Analysis of the facts and figures about parliamentary control ‘post-Lisbon’ across the 
EU, using existing academic and official reports. The focus here was on instruments, 
procedures, use and conditions. 
3. Analysis of experiences with the instruments in nine parliaments. Central variables in 
this stage were the conditions, functioning of procedures, and the effects of the new 
instruments, as perceived by our respondents. Data collection consisted of interviews 
with parliamentary liaisons in Brussels, and with members of the EACs and their clerks, 
conducted during the COSAC Chairpersons Meeting in Rome, 17-18 July 2014. 
4. Analysis of experiences within the European Parliament and European Commission, on 
the basis of nine interviews in Brussels. 
5. Three case studies focusing on experiences with the post-Lisbon instruments. 
 
1.4 Case selection 
Case selection for stage three and five operated as follows. First, we chose five parliaments 
with novel instruments for EU scrutiny (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Estonia).23 Next, we 
selected four parliaments with relatively strong EU scrutiny instruments, but rather diverging 
use of the EWS:  Sweden using the instrument very often, Finland and Germany being rather 
inactive, and Poland taking an intermediate position.24 From each group, we selected one case 
for in-depth scrutiny: 
a) Austrian Nationalrat and Bundesrat: a bicameral parliament that has various 
innovative instruments that could be interesting to the Tweede Kamer. 
b) German Bundestag: a lower chamber with relatively strong EU scrutiny instruments, 
which does not use the EWS all too frequently.25   
c) Swedish Riksdag: a parliament with relatively strong EU scrutiny instruments, which 
uses the EWS rather frequently.  
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1.5 Format of the report 
In the following, we first discuss the system of EU scrutiny in the Tweede Kamer, so as to 
better focus the analysis and recommendations. Next, we provide an analysis of the building 
blocks discussed above, integrating the findings from the other four research stages. Thus, 
attention will be given to the national instruments for EU scrutiny, EWS and political dialogue 
procedures and their actual functioning in the national parliaments, followed by information 
about their use. The analysis then turns to the effects and conditions of the new instruments, 
amongst other things focusing on cooperation with other parliaments and the EU institutions. 
The report concludes in chapter 3, after which a set of recommendations for the Tweede 








Before turning to the findings of the research, we first discuss the way the Tweede Kamer 
organizes its EU-related control.  
 
2.1 Background 
The Dutch “no” to the proposal for an EU Constitution in 2005 has reinforced the process of 
gradual strengthening of the position of the Tweede Kamer in EU affairs, to the extent that it 
wants to be ‘on top of Europe’.26 The scrutiny system that has been put in place over the years 
is characterized by the principle that EU legislation should be treated like national bills. To this 
end, EU scrutiny in the Tweede Kamer has been “mainstreamed” by making the sectoral 
committees responsible for the discussion of legislative proposals and other documents. Few 
parliaments have a system with as strong an involvement of the sectoral committees as the 
Netherlands.27 The scrutiny and control instruments available are illustrated in figure 1.   
Since the early 1990s, the Dutch government sends its assessment of new Commission 
proposals, called BNC-fiches, to the parliament. These documents summarize the EU proposal 
and indicate the position and strategy of the government. While in the 1990s these documents 
were the starting point for parliamentary involvement with EU legislation, this is no longer the 
case, as the Tweede Kamer more and more takes its own initiative in discussing EU affairs. 
Currently, the starting point of scrutiny is the systematic prioritisation of Commission 
proposals on the basis of the Commission’s annual Work Programme- as depicted in the top 
left corner of Figure 1 below.28 Since 2007, the sectoral committees make a selection of 
priority dossiers that will be discussed in the committee after publication. Since the entering 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission sends all its new proposals directly 
to national parliaments, making it easier for the staff of the European Affairs Committee to 
keep track of those topics that the parliament prioritized – and making the Tweede Kamer less 
dependent on the government for providing information. 
A second important early instrument is responding to the Commission’s consultation 
documents, such as Green and White Papers. The Dutch government is expected to respond to 
these documents, and sends its reaction to the Tweede Kamer. Sometimes, a rapporteur is 
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assigned to specific dossiers, who will try to formulate a Chamber-wide position on Green or 
White Books.29 This could be combined with a position paper by the Tweede Kamer. 
A series of additional instruments follow after the Tweede Kamer receives a 
Commission proposal for legislation. All Commission proposals flowing from the agreed 
priority list are automatically tabled for discussion in the relevant sectoral committee. In 
addition, Commission proposals not included in the Work Programme may be tabled in a 
committee meeting following political initiative or administrative advice. Upon publication of 
the Commission proposal, the EU staff writes a staff memo (stafnotitie) for treatment, 
comprising suggestions for scrutiny and control instruments that could be deployed. In 2013, 
the EU staff wrote about 118 of these notices. Upon the basis of this advice, the respective 
sectoral committee decides on the follow-up in a procedural meeting, after which it can be 
discussed in a regular committee meeting.  
A general principle of the Dutch scrutiny system is that EU proposals and policy 
documents should be treated as national bills.30 This means that regular parliamentary 
instruments may be employed, such as round table hearings with relevant experts and/or 
stakeholders, and technical briefings by the European Commission or the ministry. Over the 
years, the number of briefings by staff of the EU institutions or EU agencies increased 
considerably, with an annual average over ten.31 Another instrument aimed at information 
gathering are (video)conferences with other EU institutions or parliaments. Since 2008, there 
have been about ten working visits to Brussels and other relevant capitals each year, and the 
number of occasions at which Commissioners were invited to the parliament also steadily 
grew.32  
Turning to parliamentary control, motions and written or oral questions may be 
employed for EU affairs, just like for national bills. Since 1996, another key option for a sectoral 
committee is to hold a general consultation (AO; Algemeen Overleg) with the respective 
minister (e.g. between the Committee for Social Affairs and the social affairs minister). 
Traditionally, this takes place before the meeting of the relevant Council of Ministers’ meeting 
in Brussels. In preparation for the AO, the minister sends his/her position for the upcoming 
Council meeting (geannoteerde agenda). Officially, the AOs do not have a mandating character 
(i.e. there is no legal obligation to have this meeting, and the parliamentary committee does 
not formally provide a mandate to the minister), but the AO can be followed up by a plenary 
meeting of the parliament at which motions can be presented, asking the minister to change 
his/her position. In 2012, 63 of these 'AOs' were held- in 2013, the number was 68. In addition, 
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ministers usually report after a Council meeting.  
After the signing of the Lisbon treaty, the Dutch parliament added two new 
instruments to its toolkit (see figure 1), namely the scrutiny reserve and the subsidiarity test. 
The scrutiny reserve is an instrument aimed at structuring the information provision by the 
Cabinet surrounding Council meetings. It is not a mandate, even though in general 
consultations about the Council meeting, party groups can pose substantive questions, and 
they may table motions. The subsidiarity test, secondly, implements the EWS for the 
Netherlands.  
 Finally, to better enable scrutiny of EU-affairs, the Dutch parliament has improved its 
information position, by demanding access to the Extranet database containing Council 
documents. However, this is not used very often by MPs, who still experience an information 
gap, as information on the early stages of Council decision making is missing. To this end, the 
Tweede Kamer has experimented with the instrument of rapporteur on EU policy proposals, 
after the Commission disregarded the yellow card on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
indicating that it would not withdraw the proposal. The Tweede Kamer plans to use this 
instrument more frequently in the future33. 
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2.2 Procedure for EWS and political dialogue 
The prioritization system described above is the basis for deciding whether or not to carry out 
a subsidiarity test. Within eight weeks after publication of new legislative drafts by the 
Commission, the parliament may decide to execute a subsidiarity test to check whether the 
proposal should indeed be initiated at the European level. In line with the decentralized 
organization of EU affairs, this is decided by the relevant sectoral committee. If this is the case, 
the political groups provide their comments using, with an eye on time, a procedure by e-mail. 
The EU adviser then summarizes this, and together with the relevant committee clerk, assesses 
the majority position. In case of a positive opinion on subsidiarity, the procedure ends; in case 
of a negative majority opinion, the EU advisor and clerk write a draft reasoned opinion, which 
is then submitted to the plenary for a vote. In the meantime, the EU advisor starts, through the 
liaison, to contact counterparts in other parliaments in order to see if support can be found. 
When adopted by the plenary, the letter is sent to the European Commission, European 
Parliament, Council, and the Dutch government.  
Most interviewees view the Tweede Kamer’s “toolkit”, containing the subsidiarity 
check and the other instruments, as rather adequate. The Tweede Kamer uses the EWS rather 
actively, producing a steady output of ROs and scrutiny reserves. It produced thirteen ROs in 
the period 2011 through 2013, based on fifteen subsidiarity checks carried out, as well as 
fifteen scrutiny reserves. It also is quite ambitious, wanting to be a pioneer in the issuance of a 
yellow card (interview). To this end, in a recent strategic document34 it not only suggested that 
ROs should be more extensively elaborated, but also proposed several improvements to the 
EWS procedure, mainly:35 
 Commission answers must become more substantive 
 The eight-week deadline should be increased to twelve weeks 
 The threshold for a yellow card should be lowered 
 The EWS should be broadened to encompass proportionality and legal base 
 
2.3 Effects 
Turning to the effects of the EWS, withdrawal of undesired Commission proposals is not seen 
as the only desirable outcome. Other goals are signalling to voters that the parliament takes 
their interests seriously, and that MPs take responsibility for EU policy. There is a shared sense 
of dissatisfaction about the effects of the yellow cards that materialized so far (interview). On 
the other hand, one Dutch respondent observed that it is only five years after Lisbon − a period 
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in which national parliaments have started working with new procedures − a stage which is still 
one of experimenting. Yet, the interviewees also observed that the fact that it has proven 
possible to draw two yellow cards36 is positive. Also, an important side effect is that the Dutch 
minister used the EPPO yellow card to strengthen its position in the negotiations. Two other 
respondents shared this view, explaining that an important (but rather minimal) side effect is 
that the government is made aware of the position in the parliament. Finally, one respondent 
noted a side effect in a sectoral committee, namely much more interest in the substantive 
aspects of a European file, also after the subsidiarity test. From the point of view of a more 
direct link between the EU and its citizens, and public debate, it is important to note that due 
to the strict time frame, subsidiarity tests are usually carried out through an e-mail procedure, 
away from the spotlight. At the same time, it must be noted that the Tweede Kamer tries to 
communicate actively about its role in EU control, using social media and more traditional 
channels. 
 
2.4 Conditions  
Interviews with representatives of Dutch parliament brought to light several conditions for the 
use of the EWS in the Tweede Kamer. Capacity at the administrative level was not flagged as a 
main problem, although the workload is perceived to be rather high – possibly also as a result 
of the rather ambitious stance of the administration of the EAC. The workload as experienced 
by sectoral staff might thus be a problem. Capacity at the political level is reported to be 
problematic especially for smaller parties, who are reported to have problems getting involved 
in EU affairs. In this respect, the rather small Tweede Kamer, with fourteen political groups, 
cannot be compared to larger and less fragmented parliaments, like the German Bundestag.  
Awareness of the available instruments amongst sectoral MPs and their staff seems 
low. This is compensated by the active role of the EAC staff, which is reported to play a key 
role in activating MPs –  as reflected by the practice to advise Committee members on the use 
of control instruments available. According to several respondents, the EU staff plays a rather 
influential role, suggesting and stimulating use of control instruments. The general 
understanding amongst our respondents, however, is that ultimately, the choice to use 
instruments for EU control is and should be political in nature.  
Turning to the condition of role conception, the Tweede Kamer views itself as having a 
key role between the European Union and Dutch citizens. This role conception, detailed in a 
set of more specific action points, was adopted almost unanimously by the Tweede Kamer.37 
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Yet in actual activity, some differences between party groups are reported to exist. Especially 
those political parties that are more critical about further European integration have a high 
stake in EU scrutiny.38 According to several respondents, the use of the EWS instrument in the 
end is a cost-benefit calculation made by MPs. A crucial condition for activation of the 
procedure is to have a member taking the initiative, which in the words of one respondent is 
‘mostly a matter of interest, passion, and ownership, and intrinsic interests being at stake’. 
 
2.5 Cooperation  
To improve inter-parliamentary cooperation (a crucial condition for producing more yellow 
cards), the Tweede Kamer has already made several proposals and initiatives, such as a contact 
list, a meeting of EAC clerks, the proposal to hold ‘cluster of interest meetings’ (ad hoc 
meetings between groups of parliaments dealing with a particular policy theme), and the idea 
to allow for exchange of substantive arguments beyond subsidiarity.39  
There is no systematic intra-parliamentary cooperation in the Netherlands, i.e. 
cooperation with the Eerste Kamer, on the subsidiarity test. The respondents do not see this as 
a problem. That is, despite the fact that the two chambers have their own procedures, 
administrative cooperation is said to function properly. In about half of the cases ROs are 
adopted jointly by both chambers.  
From the vantage point of the Tweede Kamer, cooperation with the EU institutions 
could be strengthened, as this might be an important way for improving the effects of 
reasoned opinions or yellow cards. The conferences organized by the EP are seen as offering 
too limited opportunities for interaction. Contacts with MEPs are rather thin and ad hoc, and 
could be systematized. Contacts with the Commission could also be improved, going beyond 








This chapter reports the insights produced by the factual analysis, interviews within national 
parliaments and EU institutions, and the three case studies, integrating them thematically.  
 
3.1 Instruments 
COSAC surveys show the relative importance of indirect instruments, related to the control of 
national government in EU matters: 92% of parliaments/chambers identified holding 
governments to account for their participation in the Council as being the most important task 
of parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs.40  
The study of the nine parliaments, including the in-depth case studies, provided four 
most popular indirect scrutiny instruments, namely information rights, voting instructions, 
follow-up after Council negotiations, and rapporteurs. The Tweede Kamer might learn from 
these instruments in several respects.  
To begin with, the interviews made clear that parliaments have different degrees of 
parliamentary information rights. Firstly, besides the “normal” flow of information between 
government and parliament that often includes explanatory memorandums from the 
government on Commission proposals, some parliaments can oblige the government to 
provide additional information. Most notably, in Finland, the government may submit to the 
parliament anything relating to the EU, and is obliged to do so if the Grand Committee so 
demands – which has led to a flexible working understanding on the sharing of information. 
This includes information on issues or documents that are not formally part of the powers of 
the parliament, such as non-legislative Commission documents. Similarly, in Sweden, sectoral 
committees may oblige the government to provide information on EU matters.41  
Specifically, some parliaments have obtained more extensive access to information 
about negotiations in the Council of Ministers. In particular, the Italian Camera dei Deputi 
recently adopted a new rule concerning the exchange of information. Accordingly, the Italian 
Permanent Representative has to provide the parliamentary liaison with all information 
pertaining to EU negotiations, including trilogues, minutes of COREPER and Council working 
groups, and detailed documents on the Italian position. The German Bundestag also has 
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extensive access to documents pertaining to negotiations, including documents of informal 
ministerial meetings, COREPER, and Council working groups; as well as the ‘coordinated 
instructions for the German representative’ on COREPER and reports from the Permanent 
Representation.42 This information, along with many other documents, is available in the 
electronic information system EuDox, and all documents are accompanied by government 
opinions (doppeltes Ueberweisungsverfahren). Other parliaments mostly receive information 
through reports from the government on Council negotiations, such as in Finland and Sweden; 
or through ‘pre-’ and ‘post-briefings’ on Council meetings, such as in Belgium.43 While the 
Polish government must submit to the Sejm written information ‘on the progress of EU law-
making procedures and information on the Republic of Poland's positions taken in the course 
of those procedures’, it must also inform the Sejm of ‘Poland’s participation in the activities of 
the EU’ at least twice a year.44   
Second, several parliaments have stronger voting instruction instruments than the 
Tweede Kamer. Legally binding mandates exist in Austria, Estonia, and Poland, whereas the 
German, Finnish and Swedish parliament use the instrument of opinions, which are only 
politically binding. In Belgium, an informal mandating power is argued to exist. Generally, 
these indirect instruments are seen as very effective instruments for influencing EU decision 
making. In Sweden, the mandate instrument is seen to be rather efficient, because the EAC can 
decide without plenary debate.  
Third, Finland and Sweden have a particularly interesting instrument of follow-up to 
mandates. If a minister cannot stick to an opinion, they must get back to the Parliament. 
Sometimes, even virtual sessions with the national parliament are held during Council 
meetings. 
Fourth, several respondents noted instruments to make MPs responsible for EU 
affairs. The Polish Sejm uses a system of rapporteurs who are assigned to EU legislative 
proposals, while the Greek parliament has a more informal system in which a certain MP takes 
the lead. The Polish rapporteurs are MPs of the EAC who have an interest in the Commission 
proposal under scrutiny. The rapporteur introduces the document of his responsibility in the 
EUAC and to other MPs. In case a reasoned opinion is adopted, it is also the task of the 
rapporteur to draft the opinion. He or she is also responsible to attend the relevant EU 
meetings or inter-parliamentary meeting were the proposal is discussed. However, the 
rapporteur has no mandate from the EAC and cannot represent the views of the whole Polish 
Sejm at such meetings, if there is no plenary agreement or already an agreement on issuing an 
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RO. In the Polish system, there is a ‘reporting deputy’ for each draft legislative act selected for 
discussion.45  
In a similar vein, but in a somewhat broader setting, the Belgian Chambre des 
représentants has introduced a system of “Europromoters”: every sectoral committee has 
appointed such a Europromoter among its members, who has the task to follow the EU policy 
making processes that are relevant for the committee.46 The idea is that these MPs stimulate 
other committee members to study and scrutinize European legislative dossiers. Moreover, 
the Europromoter is formally responsible for drafting a reasoned opinion under the EWS, and 
could thus potentially stimulate the scrutiny of subsidiarity issues. Although the results of this 
system are not clear yet, given the structural character of the system in contrast to ad hoc 
rapporteurs on specific dossiers or draft legislative acts, it could promote the scrutiny of EU 
affairs in day-to-day parliamentary work.47 
 Despite the great importance of indirect EU scrutiny, 20 out of 37 parliaments believe 
that democratic accountability should also include EU institutions directly, the EWS being 
slightly more popular than the political dialogue.48 Whereas the legislative phase of EU 
decision making is most popular, several parliaments try to scrutinize Commission consultation 
or strategic documents. In Sweden, scrutiny of Green and White Papers is even obligatory.49 
Both the Austrian and Swedish parliament tend to bundle various instruments, in order to 
increase effectiveness.  
 
3.2 Procedures and actual functioning 
To enable actual use of the EWS and political dialogue, most parliaments have adopted their 
laws and rules of procedure for parliamentary scrutiny accordingly.50 The main difference in 
procedures is with the actors involved: a range of parliaments conduct subsidiarity checks 
mainly in the European Affairs Committee, whereas others use a more decentralised system 
run by sectoral committees (e.g. Sweden, Tweede Kamer, German Bundestag, and 
Luxembourg). A third group of parliaments has hybrid systems.51 A second key difference is the 
role of the plenary. The Dutch situation of plenary involvement is obligatory in sixteen other 
parliaments or chambers.52  
As our interviews borne out, three parliaments deliberately developed highly 
complicated procedures, so as to make use of the EWS virtually impossible. In one self-
reportedly pro-European parliament, the conscious choice was to develop a system that would 




The comparison of the nine parliaments revealed key similarities concerning the role 
of the administration. Mostly, administrators play a role in the selection and prioritization of 
Commission proposals and recommendation of instruments to be used, while the final choice 
of instruments is in political hands.54 In Austria, interestingly, the selection is made by both 
administrative and political staff. After administrative staff has prepared a pre-selection list, so-
called political group advisors develop a list of proposals that are placed on the agenda of the 
sectoral committees, which then makes the final choice. An exception in this regard is Sweden, 
which does not have a selection system: MPs look into all Commission proposals, making a 
selection for further scrutiny. Administration does not have a task here, because this is 
believed to be a political responsibility. 
Most parliaments, furthermore, use the same procedure for the EWS as for the 
political dialogue. Some parliaments, however, do not regulate the procedure for the political 
dialogue in great detail (Sweden, Portugal, Austria, and Ireland).55  
An important aspect of the actual functioning of the EWS procedure is the 
understanding of subsidiarity. Despite allegations of differences in opinion,56 parliaments seem 
united in their understanding of the subsidiarity principle as a legal concept. However, 
concerns about breaches of the principle are raised on the basis of political reasons. Even in 
those parliaments with a rather formalistic understanding, political and legal concerns interact. 
Several respondents indicated, however, that subsidiarity is a very problematic concept, 
especially because it is hard to distinguish from proportionality.57  
 
3.3 Use of EWS and political dialogue  
As shown in figure 2, actual use of the EWS and Political Dialogue is highly divergent between 
parliaments. Sweden is by far the most active parliament when it comes to issuing reasoned 
opinions, with 48 ROs in the period 2010-2013. Sweden is followed by Luxembourg (16), the 
French Senate (15) the Tweede Kamer (14), the UK House of Commons (13), and the Polish 
Sejm (12). Least active in sending Reasoned Opinions are parliaments of Slovenia (both 











Figure 3 | Use of the political dialogue per parliament/chamber (2010-2013)
59
 
Note: Sweden does not use the political dialogue actively. The high number of contributions in this table 
is due to the fact that the European Commission counts the Swedish reactions to green and white 
papers as contributions under the political dialogue.  
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The political dialogue, as shown in figure 3, is used much more often than the RO. Portugal is 
the top user, with more than 700 opinions until 2013. This might be related to the fact that 
there is no formal procedure for the Political Dialogue in Portugal. More in general, several 
parliaments prefer the political dialogue over the EWS, because it does not ‘put a break on 
European integration’.60 Several parliaments concentrate on either the PD or the subsidiarity 
check. A third group of countries uses neither instrument frequently, for reasons that will be 
set out below.  
 
3.4 Effects 
This research relied on interviews with key stakeholders to obtain information on perceived 
direct and side effects of ROs. Starting with the first direct effect of influencing legislative 
outcome, the interviews in the nine parliaments revealed that there is low faith in legislative 
effectiveness of the EWS, largely due to the allegedly slow speed and low quality of 
Commission responses to ROs. This impression is confirmed to some extent by interviews with 
representatives of the European institutions. The reasoned opinions as such were said to have 
only little real influence, as they are a small factor: given the large amount of input from 
various actors, a reasoned opinion becomes just one piece of information among many. The 
fact that national parliaments fairly often submit contradicting opinions does not help to 
enhance effectiveness.  
In this regard, several respondents from the national parliaments describe a 
boomerang effect of being “too active” with ROs. They are alleged to weaken a parliament’s 
credibility with the Commission and parliaments in other member states. One liaison even 
describes how reasoned opinions by very active parliaments are not regarded seriously, when 
making the decision whether or not to follow other parliaments. Finally, Austrian and Finnish 
respondents explained an unintended effect of inactivity, namely that the Commission in case 
of a Yellow Card may view the absence of ROs from a particular parliament as implicit 
agreement with a particular proposal. 
Interviews within the EU institutions suggest that personal contacts between 
national MPs and the Commission are said to be more effective than formal contacts 
through the EWS if one wants to influence legislative outcomes. Timely involvement is more 
appreciated by the Commission than comments on draft legislation in the final stage. The 
Commission advises parliaments to provide input at an early stage, because changes can then 
be more easily implemented. Yet, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, national 
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parliaments seem to have started to give relatively more attention to already proposed 
legislation, and less attention to Green and White Papers in their dialogue with the 
Commission.61/62 This is a possible side effect of the EWS that should not be disregarded. 
In addition, our parliamentary respondents were fairly united in expressing 
disappointment with the European Commission’s responses to the earlier yellow cards.63 
Crucially, the European Commission has discretionary room to decide how to respond. 
Experience so far has learned that a yellow card does not automatically lead to withdrawal or 
amendment of the proposal. On balance, the Commission is still primarily oriented toward the 
Council and the European Parliament: the political assessment whether a proposal can make it 
through these legislative institutions largely sets the Commission’s course.64 
Turning to the effects in the European Parliament, our interviews did not sketch a 
positive picture either. Despite the presence of a system of information dissemination in the 
EP, reasoned opinions and other parliamentary contributions were argued to receive little 
attention by MEPs. In general, subsidiarity questions are not as pressing as at the national 
level.65/66  According to one MP we interviewed, the EWS has even deteriorated cooperation 
between MPs and MEPs, even within party groups. This image is sustained by interviews within 
the European institutions. Whereas the disinterest in the EP is said to be partly related to the 
information overload experienced by MEPs, a general sense of rivalry vis-à-vis national 
parliaments is also said to exist. Not all MEPs allegedly appreciate the direct involvement of 
national parliaments in EU decision making.  
At the same time, this picture of disappointment is offset by several other 
observations. According to some respondents in Brussels, if national parliaments really want to 
have their voice heard in Brussels, they have to persist. There is a general expectation that the 
new Commission and the newly elected European Parliament will listen more carefully to 
national parliaments.67 In addition, interviews with the Commission indicated that the EWS has 
increased the urgency to take subsidiarity seriously. The knowledge that national parliaments 
may reject a proposal on grounds of non-compliance with the subsidiarity principle has 
increased the Commission’s awareness that initiatives have to be justified from this 
perspective. Although national parliaments are still not satisfied with the explanations from 
the Commission, the number of proposals that are solely justified on the basis of the simple 
conclusion that the proposal complies with the subsidiarity principle has declined over the last 
years.68/69 
Turning to the effects on deliberation and representation, these seem fairly limited. 
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The study shows that the EWS has so far led to more plenary debate on EU Affairs in only one 
member state (Austrian parliament). Strikingly, however, in Sweden the active use of the EWS 
instruments makes debate less necessary, because subsidiarity concerns are now handled in 
an earlier stage of decision making than before.  The effect of the EWS on establishing a better 
link between citizens and Europe also seems limited. While this is recognized as a desired 
effect in various parliaments, the EWS has so far not attracted public interest in EU matters. 
Only in two parliaments (Austria, Finland), there is a perception that the EWS increases public 
interest.  
Our interviews in the nine parliaments did reveal, however, several side effects of the 
EWS and political dialogue at the national level. In four out of the nine parliaments studied, the 
EWS is said to have increased EU awareness in parliament. Other side effects mentioned by 
some parliaments were better scrutiny of the substantive aspects of Commission proposals, 
going beyond subsidiarity only (Austria, Estonia, Greece).  
The effects of ROs on governments’ negotiation positions are not unequivocal.  
According to one of our respondents in Brussels, it is questionable whether governments take 
into account the opinions of their parliaments; this will partly depending on the stringency of 
parliamentary control over the government.70 In this regard it is worth noting that ROs, 
although primarily directed at the Commission, may also bind government in a more direct 
way. In Austria, ROs directly bind national government. In Sweden this is effect is more 
indirect: here the parliament tables the RO during the meeting held prior to the Council 
meeting.  
In Austria, finally, a surprising institutional effect is claimed to have arisen: the EWS is 
said to have strengthened the general position and even raison d'être of the Austrian 
Bundesrat, which has adopted a key role in performing subsidiarity tests.71 
 
3.5 Conditions  
Analysis of both quantitative data, as depicted in Appendix 2, and qualitative experiences in 
the parliaments has not produced a one-size fits all explanation for the use of the new 
instruments. While similar types of conditions have an effect in the various parliaments, a fine-
grained picture of so-called “equifinality” appears: there are multiple causal pathways to the 
use or non-use of the instruments. Although a thorough understanding of all these pathways 
was not feasible within the scope of this study, the following picture arises. 
Starting with the constitutional perspective, respondents highlighted awareness of the new 
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instruments as a problem in just two of the nine the parliaments.72 In addition, our factual 
analysis shows that capacity in terms of the number of staff is not a necessary condition for 
the use of the EWS, although several less active parliaments mention in the twentieth COSAC 
report that they suffer from limited resources available for EU scrutiny work (e.g. Greece, 
Ireland and Estonia).73 This image is supported by the interviews. Capacity problems were 
mentioned by respondents from Estonia, Greece, Finland, and the Italian Camera dei Deputati. 
In Sweden, the capacity problem was said to be solved by the decentralised system, which 
allows for sharing of the work- although it is offset by a requirement that all Commission 
proposals are scrutinized by MPs. A final relevant insight is that capacity is not an a-political 
condition: in some parliaments, such as Finland, low capacity for EU matters is linked to a 
perception that the parliament does not have a large role to play concerning the EWS.74 
Turning to the various national procedures for the EWS, whereas some parliaments 
with decentralised systems are very active (Luxembourg, Tweede Kamer, Sweden), this is not a 
necessary condition for active use, as evidenced by the French Sénat and the UK and Polish 
lower houses. Across the board, however, the chambers that use a very complex procedure 
involving different actors at the administrative and political level are amongst the less active 
parliaments (e.g. Germany, Portugal, Belgium and Finland). 
Parliaments, as said, differ regarding the role of the plenary under the EWS/political 
dialogue.75 Plenary involvement, despite being time-consuming, has no clear effect on the 
number of ROs adopted by a parliament.  
Amongst the active parliaments, there is an over-representation of institutionally 
strong parliaments, which have wide access to information, a strong scrutiny infrastructure, 
and strong powers of control.76 Yet, institutional strength is not a necessary condition for 
frequent use. That is, the Polish Sejm, the Dutch Eerste Kamer, the French Sénat, and the UK 
House of Commons only score moderately on institutional strength relating to EU matters, as 
shown in Appendix 2, while being fairly active under the EWS. Vice versa, Denmark, Germany 
(both chambers), Estonia, Finland, and Lithuania are comparatively strong, but use the EWS to 
a low or moderate degree.77 To better understand the effect of institutional strength, we thus 
need to break this down into its various aspects, by turning to the interviews. 
To start with, information rights were said to be an important condition for use of the 
EWS. Sweden, Poland, and Austria, which were very satisfied with their strong information 
rights, are amongst the active parliaments. An interesting exception is formed by Germany and 




The study of the nine parliaments corroborates earlier findings that the presence of 
strong control powers vis-à-vis the government does not have a clear effect on the use of the 
EWS. While various parliaments combine legal or political mandating powers with active use of 
the ESW (Sweden, Poland, and Austria) others with strong political mandates (Finland and 
Germany) hardly use the EWS.79 The presence of more effective instruments to indirectly exert 
control on EU matters is argued by some to preclude active use of the EWS. This is primarily an 
argument in the German case. Another striking finding in this respect is that Upper Chambers 
tend to be much more active in using the political dialogue than Lower Chambers. This may be 
due to their more remote position to governments.80 
Turning to the cultural perspective, the interviews provided support for the 
importance of role conceptions. According to various respondents in Belgium, Estonia, 
Germany, Italy, and Poland, the perceived positive popular stance towards European 
integration is a key condition for the fairly infrequent use of the EWS in these parliaments. 
Polish, Belgian, and Italian respondents explained how the EWS is seen as rather negative, 
which is why the political dialogue is seen as a positive alternative, sometimes even with the 
aim of expressing support for European integration. This alleged condition is hard to capture 
statistically, however: EU trust or support for EU membership as measured by the 
Eurobarometer do not have a clear effect on use. In the German case, the incentives for the 
mainstream parties to stand by the process of European integration are strong, as a result of a 
generally pro-European constituency, a dominant position of the German government in 
Europe, and major political and economic benefits from EU integration.  
The consensus amongst the Finnish respondents was that national parliaments should 
not have an independent role at the EU level, which explains the inactivity of the Finnish 
parliament. A similar argument can be made for the German case, where the general idea is 
that it is the government negotiating in Brussels, and the role of parliament is to control 
government − facilitated by the existence of strong scrutiny instruments. However, the 
influence of these parliamentary role conceptions could not be fully specified for all EU 
parliaments. Those parliaments labelled ‘European players’ (seeking to play an active role at 
the EU level) by the OPAL group,81 are not necessarily highly active, as evidenced by the 
position of the Czech lower house illustrated in Appendix 2. However, parliaments with a very 
strong and exclusive focus on national government, without playing a strong European role, 
are hardly active under the EWS and political dialogue, with the exception of Poland.   
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Parliamentary role conceptions are highly case-specific. This is evidenced by a 
comparison between the Finnish and Swedish case. Similarly to Finland, the consensus in the 
Swedish Riksdag is that national parliaments should not play too independent a role at the EU 
level. Unlike in Finland, this position does not translate into inactivity, as evidenced by the 
frequent use in Sweden. According to Swedish respondents, the active use of the EWS is 
related to a general duty towards the law in Sweden: MPs across the political spectrum are 
claimed to see it as their obligation to use the instruments they have at their disposal, as a 
responsibility to their voters, and as a means for safeguarding national interests.  
  Furthermore, the interviews in the nine parliaments provided much support for the 
negotiation perspective on the EWS. Respondents from various parliaments stressed the 
importance of a “pusher” who is willing to invest time and energy. This is not necessarily an 
MP, but may also be an administrator, external stakeholder, or even the government pushing 
for a subsidiarity check, as happens sometimes in those parliaments that actually prefer not to 
use the EWS. One of the Austrian respondents explained that it is crucial that MPs create an 
‘appetite for Europe’ amongst their colleagues. The role of personalities, as shown by the 
Austrian case study, can be far-ranging, given the fact that both the chair and vice-chair of the 
Bundesrat are highly interested in European politics, actively trying to make a difference.   
Components of the cost-benefit analysis differ per parliament and case, but strong 
preferences on politically salient topics, are main parameters. Other considerations, instead, 
work against the active use of the EWS. Several respondents explain that MPs do not see the 
instrument as having great added value, because Europe is not seen as important by voters. 
The presence of other important national topics on the agenda, and intra-coalition dissensus, 
also were argued to reduce the attractiveness of the EWS. The position of the government is 
an important influence on the activity in specific dossiers- parliaments being asked to either 
adopt an RO, or to steer clear from doing so. Finally, several respondents indicated that the 
disappointing reaction of the Commission so far hinders activation of the EWS, whereas some 
actually argue that this has triggered MPs to become more active. 
 
3.6 Intra-parliamentary cooperation 
Cooperation between chambers of a parliament may be seen as way to increase the chances 
of a yellow card being adopted. Yet our factual analysis has not provided any explicit best 
practices of institutionalized cooperation. Most bicameral parliaments we studied have 
different procedures in the two chambers for conducting subsidiarity checks. Cooperation is 
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mostly non-binding and informal, with the exception of the Spanish and Irish parliament. 
These have formal tools for cooperation between the chambers.  
In Austria, the administrative staff works for both parliaments. Yet this does not 
necessarily lead to more cooperation. Interestingly, both chambers have submitted reasoned 
opinions on the same dossier only once (until 2012). According to Miklin, this is due to the 
different degree of priority that is given in the two chambers to EU scrutiny, as well as to 
conflicting schedules and organizational difficulties in meeting the eight-week deadline.82  
The situation is further complicated in federal parliaments, where regional parliaments 
have competences under the EWS, such as Austria, Belgium, and Spain. Particularly in Belgium 
the division of competences under the EWS between the regional and central parliament is not 
always clear and can delay the procedure.83 The interviews we carried out in bicameral 
parliaments pointed towards the importance of informal information exchange, as is the case 
in the Netherlands.  
 
3.7 Inter-parliamentary cooperation 
Cooperation between national parliaments, in the sense of exchanging arguments and 
amassing support, is important for the effective use of the EWS. Indeed, without such 
cooperation the threshold of parliaments would be hard to meet, given the fact that national 
MPs mostly do not test EU legislation across the board.84 Inter-parliamentary cooperation runs 
through a diversity of channels, some of which are political in composition, others 
administrative. In the following, we introduce the main channels mentioned most often by the 
respondents: COSAC meetings, administrative liaisons in Brussels, and IPEX. 
The most important formal forum for inter-parliamentary cooperation is the 
Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European 
Union (COSAC).85 COSAC meetings take place twice a year, and are organized and chaired by 
the parliament of the country which holds the rotating Presidency. They serve to exchange 
views, information, best practices, and expertise on EU matters.86 Each delegation consists of 
six members from EACs from national parliaments, and six members of the European 
Parliament. Often, COSAC invites guest speakers such as European Commissioners or 
representatives of the rotating presidency. In addition to the biannual meetings, the 
chairpersons of EACs also meet twice a year within the COSAC format, where similar 
networking opportunities exist. 
Most parliaments (27 out of 31) perceive networking as the most successful aspect of 
26 
 
COSAC meetings. This networking function became particularly visible when the first yellow 
card (Monti II) was issued.87 Nevertheless, there is quite some criticism on COSAC meetings. 18 
out of 31 Parliaments/Chambers identify the quality of debate during COSAC meetings as the 
least successful aspect of this type of inter-parliamentary cooperation.88 Most parliaments do 
not consider COSAC to be the right venue for collective decision making, instead preferring 
COSAC to be used as a more informal setting by increasing the number of side meetings to 
discuss specific legislative proposals.89 This has been the position of the Tweede Kamer for 
some years, as evidenced by its report on Democratic Legitimacy.90 
A problem plaguing COSAC meetings is that MPs representing their parliament usually 
do not have a mandate. Also, as evidenced by the Swedish case study, some parliaments may 
not be willing to proactively look for coalitions, or engage in persuasion attempts.91 The 
general absence of mandates reduces the attractiveness of formal exchange of thoughts, and 
is an important argument for having more informal meetings, rather than having discussions in 
the plenary. The dominance of formal interactions is one of the reasons why COSAC meetings 
are not viewed as very valuable by most of our respondents. In addition, points of criticism are 
the absence of MPs from some parliaments (or at least difficulties of engaging them), 
dominance by EP and Commission, and the dependence on accidental personal contacts.92  
A majority of our interviewees suggested that COSAC meetings should become more 
substantive, allowing for dialogue and exchange of views, preferably through more room for 
ad hoc interaction.93 Parliaments focusing primarily on control of their national government 
have a lot to gain. According to several respondents in these parliaments, sharing of 
information on specific dossiers may help them to better control the government.94 Two 
respondents take another stance, suggesting that COSAC should focus more on institutional 
issues, and the role of national parliaments in EU decision making. However, the feasibility of 
this suggestion seems limited, as many parliaments are not interested in such exchange.95 
At the administrative level, national parliaments cooperate through the parliamentary 
liaisons in Brussels, which together form an informal network. The representatives exchange 
information and coordinate the submissions of reasoned opinions. They provide a ‘bridge-
building function’ across national parliaments.96 A main instrument for doing so are the 
Monday Morning Meetings of the Representatives held each week. Most parliaments and 
chambers consider the liaison officers in Brussels as highly useful.97 According to our 
respondents, the role of the liaisons is crucial for the EWS, as they function as the “eyes and 
ears” of parliaments in Brussels.98 
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A third instrument for inter-parliamentary cooperation worth mentioning is IPEX- 
‘InterParliamentary EU information eXchange’ (sic). This is a platform for the exchange of 
information between national parliaments and the European Parliament concerning issues 
related to the European Union, especially in light of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Parliaments make varying use of IPEX for example by adding national documents.99 The 
countries that upload most documents on IPEX are Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the Czech and French Senates ant the Polish Sejm.100 Many parliaments criticize the 
database for not being up to date and information only being available in national languages. 
This view is supported by a recent academic study.101 The interviews sustain this critical view of 
IPEX, the main problem being that little information is actually uploaded in time. According to 
a respondent, the reason is that many parliaments may not share information that is not 
official.102 
Fourth, there seems to be a consensus amongst the respondents in the national 
parliaments that there is no need for new systems or instruments for inter-parliamentary 
cooperation, except one: exchanging lists of priorities by those parliaments who scrutinize the 
Commission Work Programme.103 However, as one respondent put it, the general idea seems 
to be to ‘first improve existing instruments before creating new ones’. 
 
3.8 Legislative influence: the need for cooperation with EU institutions 
After the Treaty of Lisbon, both the European Commission and European Parliament 
developed procedures for dealing with reasoned opinions and yellow cards.104 
The European Commission currently employs a self-imposed deadline of three months 
to respond to ROs, which it usually meets. Our respondents in the nine lower chambers were 
rather critical about the European EWS procedure. Their main complaints concern the lack of 
influence of yellow cards, the tight time frame of eight weeks, and the quality and speed of the 
Commission´s response. Several respondents argued that the understanding of subsidiarity is 
too restricted, and should be broadened to also encompass proportionality, even though 
Austrian and Swedish respondents argued that proportionality may be a part of subsidiarity.105 
In response to these criticisms, Commission respondents explained that faster 
answers, as desired by national parliaments, are not feasible, especially in complicated cases. 
The fact that the answers tend to be rather formal is seen as a given, because of the formal 
nature of the procedure.106 In addition, the processing of complex questions takes quite some 
time, because it requires the involvement of several services within the Commission. Another 
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complicating factor from the Commission’s vantage point is that the views of national 
parliaments often diverge greatly. It is not only unnecessary, but also impossible for the 
Commission to satisfy the demands of all national parliaments.107  
 In order to enhance the utility of the EWS, respondents in the Commission suggested 
that parliaments should provide a more extensive and clearer motivation, and distinguish 
between substantive (political) and subsidiarity arguments. Moreover, according to the 
Commission, they could give ROs the form of an “amendment”. Finally, the Commission 
argued that parliaments could use a standard opening paragraph for reasoned opinions, and 
possibly even a shared format.108 Coordinating the argumentation of an RO is also advised.109  
National parliaments could contribute to a uniform interpretation of the subsidiarity 
principle by appealing to the European Court of Justice if their reasoned opinions have been 
ignored, while they still believe that the legislation infringes the subsidiarity principle. In light 
of the generally felt need for better personal contacts with the Commission, it could be 
recommended to have a meeting with the Commission after the submission of a reasoned 
opinion by several parliaments. However, this may be difficult for those parliaments that, 
according to our respondents, explicitly rule out lobbying the Commission.110 From the vantage 
point of the national parliaments, interaction with the Commission is generally seen as 
attractive, but difficult to organize.111 
Turning to the European Parliament, above we described the fact that MEPs do not 
actively follow the contributions made by national parliaments. To this end, the EP secretariat 
is planning to introduce some new tools, such as directly signalling to the rapporteur if there is 
a lot of parliamentary attention.112 In addition, according to respondents within the EP, mutual 
relations with the EP could be strengthened through regular participation in inter-
parliamentary conferences and intensified bilateral contacts, both on a personal level and by 
making use of videoconferences. Thus, cooperation in the context of the EWS should be seen 
against the background of cooperation more broadly. To improve relations, it seems important 
to ensure that the focus is not on differences of opinion only, instead searching for common 
interests.113  
Even though contacts between MEPs and MPs are not yet a “natural” part of the 
legislative process, they are claimed to have intensified in recent years.114 Several instruments 
and developments are noteworthy. First, the EP regularly organizes meetings involving 
national parliaments, sometimes in cooperation with the parliament from the member state 
holding the presidency.115 The 21st biannual COSAC report indicates that the majority of 
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chambers/parliaments (24 out of 38) regularly attend the irregular inter-parliamentary 
meetings held at the premises of the European Parliament. Only Denmark and the Slovenian 
Drzavni zbor rarely attended these meetings. Most parliaments consider the quality of debate 
during such meetings the weakest aspect, while networking and exchange of best practices are 
considered to be the most important aspects of such meetings.116  
In recent years, the emphasis has shifted to the creation of smaller networks around 
specific topics, and the organization of small-scale meetings where only rapporteurs, experts 
or committee chairs are present.117 This trend of specialization has revolved around specialist 
Joint Committee Meetings organized jointly by the EP and the national Parliament of the 
country holding the rotating Presidency, and Interparliamentary Committee Meetings 
organized by the EP.118 These substantive meetings are explicitly welcomed by some of our 
respondents from the national parliaments.119  
An alternative instrument for cooperation with the EP are bilateral contacts between 
MPs and MEPs. Parliaments however generally do not systematically engage in these.120 
Several parliaments have instruments for involving MEPs in national operations, such as the 
right of MEPs to observe committee meetings (Austria), or even membership of committees 
(Belgium).121 Finally, there are remarkable differences between parliaments: the French 
Assemblée Nationale is particularly active, for instance by engaging with EP rapporteurs. The 
German Bundestag also has a rather strong practice, because of the presence of political 
liaisons in Brussels, and by organizing committee meetings in Brussels.122 
Several other instruments for inter-parliamentary cooperation exist. One instrument 
are bilateral visits. MEPs particularly value bilateral visits that are organised by member states 
about to take over the presidency of the Council, because they provide for more thorough 
discussions with a limited number of participants and an opportunity to exchange views on 
concrete issues.123/124 Since fairly recently, it is possible to use videoconferences for bilateral 
meetings too. These save time and resources, and may partially resolve agenda-setting 
problems that are sometimes in the way of successful cooperation. To this end, the European 
Parliament has good technological facilities at its disposal, including a few channels for 
translation. About half of the national parliaments have the necessary facilities for 
videoconferences.125 
To sum up, the main message concerning cooperation with the European institutions is 
that the EWS should be seen as one step in a longer process of influencing, starting with Green 
and White Papers. Greater emphasis on informal contacts with the Commission and the EP are 
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advised, as well as more focused substantive meetings based upon common interests, 
according to respondents in the institutions. The European institutions do not support the 
creation of new instruments for national parliaments. For example, a “green card procedure” 
is perceived as undesirable, because even the European Parliament does not have any formal 
right of initiative.126 In addition, it should be taken into account that parliaments from larger 










For a long time, national parliaments were considered the “losers” of European integration, 
given the transfer of policy competences to the European level combined with the strong 
position of national executives in European Union decision making.127 In response, parliaments 
have gradually ‘clawed back’ their powers,128 by developing rich toolkits for controlling EU 
policy making, primarily through their national governments. The Treaty of Lisbon has added 
instruments for direct control to this toolbox: the Early Warning System, consisting of the tools 
of the reasoned opinion and yellow card. The EWS supplemented the Barroso initiative, 
established in 2006, which provides for the possibility of political dialogue between national 
parliaments and the Commission. 
Many parliaments actively use the newly acquired tools, which has resulted in the 
production of a great number of parliamentary contributions to the EU policy making process. 
Parliamentarians and their staff members have found their way to inter-parliamentary 
meetings, and produced two ‘yellow cards’. Rather quickly they have obtained a new position 
in the EU landscape that cannot be ignored. The Dutch Tweede Kamer is a case in point: it has 
realized a firm position in inter-parliamentary relations, producing a steady output of 
contributions to the EU policy process and an ambitious agenda.129 
Some effects of this new activity by national parliaments already become apparent. 
Arguably, the Commission has become more aware of the principle of subsidiarity. 
Furthermore, the EU Commission has opened up to national parliaments, welcoming their 
input- if preferably in an early stage of decision making. In various parliaments, the EWS has 
played a catalyzing role, leading to more substantive scrutiny of EU affairs beyond subsidiarity, 
and more EU awareness and activity. This image sharply contrasts with the initial critical and 
limited expectations about the EWS.130 Also, given the relative newness of the EWS, further 
strengthening of this position are not unthinkable, as indicated by respondents in the EU 
institutions. 
Despite these assorted effects, the influence of individual reasoned opinions, let alone 
opinions, on EU policy making so far has been fairly limited. They have not fulfilled clear the 
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deliberative or representative functions, given the general absence of media coverage for 
reasoned opinions and yellow cards − not helped by the fact that much control activity takes 
place in hasty e-mail proceedings. In addition, the EWS has been hardly effective from the 
vantage point of legislative influence. The European Commission considers ROs, especially if 
not coordinated by parliaments, as just one input among many, MEPs often times not even 
registering them. 
Furthermore, the passing of large numbers of ROs, as well as all-too frequent attempts 
to organize inter-parliamentary coalitions for yellow cards, may incur costs on parliaments, as 
borne out by our interviews. First, highly active parliaments might lose credence with the 
Commission and parliaments more hesitant to use the EWS. Secondly, active use of the EWS 
takes away resources from other types of scrutiny, e.g. of consultation documents earlier in 
the EU policy making process- a type of involvement explicitly welcomed by the Commission. 
Third, this study has indicated that frequent use of the EWS may affect relations with the 
government, and put a strain on the relationship with the EP. Highly active use may also be 
unsustainable ‘in house’, given the somewhat variant commitment of national MPs to actually 
use the EU instruments available, combined with limits on administrative capacity.  
 
Recommendation 1: An integrated but selective approach  
This picture of the EWS’ great potential – balanced by various constraints – warrants careful 
strategic positioning by the Tweede Kamer. From the point of view of effectiveness, when 
adopting an RO, the Tweede Kamer is recommended to channel time and resources into an 
integrated approach, bundling various instruments as is done in both Sweden and Austria. This 
integrated approach has three aspects. First, reasoned opinions should be seen as a 
complement to, rather than a replacement of, control over the government, which is seen by 
many parliaments as highly effective. Second, an integral approach to the EWS requires an 
active stance in inter-parliamentary cooperation, as well as follow-up of ROs with the 
Commission, EP, national parliaments, national government, and other stakeholders, including 
the media. An instrument that could be helpful to this end is the appointment of a rapporteur, 
as exemplified by the rapporteurship on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which is seen 
as a best practice in several other parliaments. Third, an integrated approach calls for scrutiny 
of Green and White papers, as done in Sweden, and explicitly welcomed by the European 
Commission. 
At the same time, such an integrated approach (and especially rapporteurs) may be 
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unsustainable if used frequently, given the political and administrative capacity that is 
required. Hence, the Tweede Kamer is explicitly advised to reserve this integrated approach for 
highly salient dossiers, based on broad and explicit political will to “go all the way”. The key to 
a durable and effective engagement with Europe is, as one Austrian respondent put it, ‘Lust für 
Europa’- explicit political commitment. Dutch MPs have an important role to play in providing 
the political steering required for active follow-up of its ambitious EU-related strategy.  
In addition, to enable channelling resources into a more integrated approach, a critical 
reconsideration of activities in the field of EU control that are less effective or visible is 
warranted. First, having an integrated approach does not equal an integral approach: the 
passing of high numbers of ROs or full scrutiny, as exemplified by the Swedish case, should not 
become an end in itself. Second, the Dutch scrutiny reserve, as shown in Figure 1 above, is a 
rather complicated instrument, requiring various procedural steps before actual substantive 
instructions can be formulated. The added value of the instrument over regular information 
rights and concomitant scrutiny instruments like questions and motions, or generalized 
information rights as available in several other parliaments, is not immediately apparent. In 
this regard, it must be noted that the existing indirect control instruments of the Tweede 
Kamer are weaker than the mandating rights various other parliaments have at their disposal, 
often combined with strong mechanisms for ex post accountability after Council negotiations. 
The Tweede Kamer is hence recommended to discuss internally whether the procedure can be 
made more efficient or replaced by more general information rights and/or a more binding 
instrument for controlling the government’s position. This also holds, mutatis mutandis, for 
the procedure for the subsidiarity test: the Tweede Kamer is advised to carefully discuss its 
efficiency and added value over regular instruments of parliamentary control like motions. 
Concerning information rights, the Tweede Kamer could critically compare its 
information position to that of Germany, Poland, Italy, and Finland, which have structural 
access to documents about COREPER meetings, trilogues, and negotiation instructions. In 
these parliaments, parliament obtains more information than in the Tweede Kamer, mostly 
provided actively by the government.  
 
Recommendation 2: Improving the EWS  
In terms of proposals for a reform of the EWS procedure, two amendments constitute a 
minimalist agenda shared by all EU-28: an extension of the eight-week deadline to twelve, but 
preferably sixteen weeks; and enhanced responsiveness both over time and in substance of 
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the reactions by the Commission, although improvements in the latter respect are duly noted. 
The Tweede Kamer is advised to take the lead in these reforms during the upcoming Dutch 
Presidency of the EU in 2016. At the same time, it is recommended to follow up on its earlier 
proposal of developing a common opening paragraph for reasoned opinions. A more ambitious 
agenda of reforms, such as a right of initiative (“Green Card”), are far more controversial. Any 
proposal in that direction should take into account that parliaments from larger member 
states may want to factor in population size. Also, such a proposal might put a strain on the 
relations with the EP, which does not have a formal right of initiative. 
 
Recommendation 3: Inter-parliamentary cooperation 
Inter-parliamentary coordination has an important function for the adoption of yellow cards. 
Furthermore, those parliaments largely seeing their role in national control of EU-affairs, are 
interested in exchange of, primarily, substantive information on EU policy making, to decrease 
dependency on governmental information. The interviews therefore showed broad interest in 
more substantive inter-parliamentary conferences, like side sessions at COSAC meetings, or 
‘cluster of interest’ meetings.131 Beyond this common denominator, the prospects of inter-
parliamentary coordination are restricted, due to the variety of roles/capacities, and lack of 
parliamentary mandates. This leads to two sets of recommendations. 
Recommendation 3a: Like-mindedness 
Several parliaments lack the willingness and/or capacity to play an active role under the EWS. 
The role perceptions of parliaments per se and with respect to control over EU legislation 
differ widely. Whereas some parliaments prefer to take second seat to the national 
government, others share the Tweede Kamer's appreciation of parliament's autonomous role 
in EU affairs. Several parliaments are opposed to discussing more institutional questions inter-
parliamentarily. In addition, capacity problems curtail the possibilities of various parliaments. 
In other words, like-mindedness is not only a matter of substantive agreement on the merits of 
a particular dossier at hand, but also of underlying role conception and capacity. Therefore, 
the Tweede Kamer is recommended to focus its attention on those parliaments willing and 
able to play an independent role at the European stage. At the same time, this is not the full 
story. Parliaments hesitant or incapable to use the EWS frequently might become active in 
specific dossiers, which makes them interesting parties to cooperate with. The Tweede Kamer 
is recommended to closely “watch” the activity of these parliaments, while realizing that 
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attempts to lobby them actively are not likely to be an effective strategy. Finally, turning to the 
operational level, it would be a good idea to stimulate the sharing of national priority lists and 
responses to Green Books and White Papers in IPEX, which could allow for faster identification 
of parliaments possibly planning to carry out subsidiarity tests. 
Recommendation 3b: COSAC meetings “new style” 
The potential of inter-parliamentary cooperation is limited by the absence of national 
parliamentary mandates and, in a related fashion, the fact that many parliaments cannot share 
information until it is official. Formal cooperation thus quickly runs into its limits. This fact 
necessitates ample opportunity for informal exchange at COSAC meetings, as requested by a 
majority of our respondents, as well as a reduction of speaking time for MEPs and 
Commissioners. Also, to increase the potential importance of COSAC meetings for obtaining 
yellow cards, these should have a certain agenda flexibility and openness to inputs from other 
parliaments than the one holding the presidency. The Tweede Kamer is advised to host COSAC 
meetings “new style” during the Dutch presidency, along the following lines: more room for 
informal exchange, the possibility of side meetings on substantive dossiers instead of having 
long plenary sessions, less central a role for representatives of EU institutions, and more 
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Appendix 2 | Patterns in use of EU instruments 




































Austria  Lower 8 24 EAC NO YES 0,45 37 25 50 36 5141 
Austria Upper 6 37 EAC 
(mostly) 
  0,51 37 25 50 36 5 
Belgium Lower 5 17 Mixed NO NO 0,24 65 11 38 49 5 
Belgium Upper 5 3 Mixed   0,16 65 11 38 49 6 
Bulgaria 2 23 EAC NO YES 0,41 48 10 31 45 10 
Cyprus 3 5 EAC NO YES 0,27 37 25 55 29 7 
Denmark 7 37 Mixed YES YES 0,69 55 16 31 54 7 
Germany Lower 3 14 Mixed NO YES 0,78 54 16 43 35 59 
Germany Upper 7 155 Dec   0,62 54 16 43 35 6 
Estonia 1 4 Mixed NO NO 0,67 49 9 24 47 6 
Finland 3 6 Mixed NO YES 0,84 47 19 38 56 - 
France Lower 2 42142 Mixed NO NO 0,55 46 19 47 32 28 
France Upper 15 34 Mixed   0,56 46 19 47 32 15 
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Greece 2 18 EAC NO NO 0,26 38 33 70 24 10 
UK Lower 13 23 EAC NO NO 0,52 26 32 48 17 15 
UK Upper 7 62 EAC  NO 0,47 26 32 48 17 24 
Hungary 1 3 EAC NO YES 0,48 32 22 40 47 7 
Ireland 5 23 Mixed NO NO 0,47 63 12 43 35 11 
Italy Lower 3 74 EAC YES NO 0,46 41 17 45 28 16 
Italy Upper 6 379 Mixed   0,54 41 17 45 28 18 
Latvia 2 4 EAC NO NO 0,53 25 21 40 38 6 
Lithuania 9 15 Mixed NO NO 0,73 49 16 21 55 23 
Luxembourg 16 32 Dec YES YES 0,40 72 13 38 47 6 
Malta 8 11 EAC NO NO 0,46 42 18 21 54 0 
Netherlands Lower 14 18 Dec YES YES 0,66 68 12 32 47 11 
Netherlands Upper 10 32 Dec   0,54 68 12 32 47 14 
Poland Lower 12 16 EAC NO YES 0,44 53 10 33 40 11 
Poland Upper 10 28 Mixed   0,45 53 10 33 40 10 
Portugal 3 709 Mixed YES NO 0,43 39 26 60 32 5 
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Romania Lower 5 110 Mixed YES NO 0,35 57 11 37 51 18 
Romania Upper 7 70    0,34 57 11 37   
Slovakia 3 4 EAC NO NO 0,49 52 10 51 31 9 
Slovenia Lower 1 6 Mixed NO NO 0,60 39 21 55 34 7 
Slovenia Upper 0 0 Mixed   0,21 39 21 55  1 
Spain (both) 9 29 EAC NO NO 0,40 55 17 72 17 6143 








Czech Republic Lower 1 26 EAC YES NO 0,58 31 19 53 32  




Appendix 3 | List of abbreviations 
 
ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
AfD Alternative für Deutschland 
AO Algemeen overleg (general consultation) 
BNC(-fiche) Beoordeling nieuwe commissievoorstellen (judgement new committee 
proposals, Dutch Parliament) 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives 
COSAC Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of 
the European Union 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
EAC European Affairs Committee 
ECB European Central Bank 
EP European Parliament 
EPPO European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
EU European Union 
EuDoX Informationssystem für europarelevante Dokumente (Information database for 
relevant EU documents, German Bundestag) 
EWS Early Warning System 
HoR House of Representatives 
IPEX Inter-parliamentary EU information exchange 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
MMMs Monday Morning Meetings 
MP Member of Parliament 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
OPAL Observatory of Parliaments After Lisbon 
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party) 
PM Policy Memorandum 
RO Reasoned opinion 
SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social-democratic party Austria) 
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TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 














 This second edition contains a number of small factual revisions to the original report, mainly concerning 
the Austrian, Belgian, and Swedish case. 
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